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Spanish to English: Verdad y Diferencia en la Segunda Hipóstasis de Plotino General field: Social Sciences Detailed field: Philosophy
Source text - Spanish Verdad y Diferencia en la Segunda Hipóstasis de Plotino.
Introducción
En un breve tratado, el IV2 (21), Plotino establece cuatro niveles de la realidad, en una escala de análisis alternativa a la tripartición jerárquica, en función de los criterios de “divisible” (meristós) o “indivisible” (améristos). Allí caracteriza al nivel inferior, la masa sensible, como lo divisible primario y al nivel superior, la Inteligencia, como lo indivisible primario. El Alma es una ousía que procede de la indivisible primaria y avanza hacia la naturaleza divisible. A su vez, en muchos pasajes de las Enéadas, Plotino afirma que la Inteligencia se conoce a sí misma pues está en contacto permanente con sus objetos, que son sus propios contenidos, mientras que en el Alma, el tipo de autoconocimiento será de segundo grado pues su actividad implica un proceso desde un objeto a otro y la percepción sensible, por su parte, es el conocimiento de un objeto exterior y cambiante. Con esto en mente, se entiende que la verdad, en el sistema hipostático de Plotino, se encuentre en el nivel de la segunda hipóstasis, pues el verdadero conocimiento se da en el autoconocimiento de la inteligencia indivisa, en la que hay una plena identificación entre sujeto y objeto.
Sin embargo, en muchos pasajes de las Enéadas, Plotino es enfático cuando argumenta que es en el Noûs en donde se halla una distinción no solamente entre sujeto y objeto sino también entre sus propios contenidos que, en V1 (10), 4 o en el tratado VI2 (43), asocia a su vez con los géneros mayores del Sofista de Platón. En el presente trabajo, intentaré presentar la noción de verdad sustentada en la identidad entre sujeto y objeto aunque atravesada también por la noción de diferencia. Esta noción no solamente explica la diversidad de los estadios inferiores sino que constituye, junto con los otros géneros, un principio ontológico del ser y del pensar. De este modo, entiendo que la diferencia no compromete la unidad de la segunda hipóstasis, ni la vuelve divisible, sino que la constituye en tanto primer generado, en tanto lo que es más “uno” en el ámbito de las cosas que son. Me valdré, entonces, de un breve análisis del capítulo 4 de la Enéada V1 (10) y de algunos pocos pasajes de los capítulos 2, 3 y 8 de VI2 (43) con vistas a destacar la función ontológica y epistemológica que el género de la diferencia presenta.
1) La verdad “proposicional”
Como he adelantado, Plotino caracteriza a la segunda hipóstasis como una inteligencia que se identifica absolutamente con su objeto, lo que es. La determinación que implica el ser no se da en el principio primero, lo Uno, simplicidad absoluta y potencia de todas las cosas. El ser, entonces, coincide con el primer grado de multiplicidad y se constituye como inteligencia cuando determina, separa, aquello que en lo Uno se encontraba unido. Al separar todas las cosas, entonces, las intelige como múltiples. Sin embargo, la inteligencia proviene de lo Uno y es una, aunque ya no sea una como lo es lo Uno puesto que contiene una unidad deficiente respecto de la de su causa, de ahí que Plotino la designe como uni-múltiple (ἓν πολλά).
Podría afirmarse que la segunda hipóstasis es múltiple en tres aspectos: es no-una, pues lo Uno es anterior a ella; es dual, pues debe haber una distinción entre sujeto y objeto; y es múltiple, pues sus propios contenidos, las Formas que se identifican con ella, lo son. Ahora bien, Plotino establece que en tanto que es allí en donde radica la verdad, la inteligencia es una unidad idéntica entre sujeto y objeto. El problema es conciliar ambas afirmaciones, es decir, en qué consiste esa identidad y multiplicidad simultáneas que distingue a la segunda hipóstasis de la tercera, en donde el pensamiento se da mediante un proceso, al menos, inferencial.
Lloyd ha propuesto que la actividad de la Inteligencia excluye el pensamiento proposicional, entendiendo que los objetos inteligibles podrían constituir los elementos simples que conformarán un juicio en el nivel inferior. Para este autor, del hecho de que para Plotino el pensamiento sea complejo -que implique una transición entre sujeto y predicado- no se sigue que también lo sea el tipo de actividad de la segunda hipóstasis pues en el pensamiento respecto de los inteligibles hay una identidad extensional e intensional, y la complejidad que implica una proposición correrá por cuenta del modo en que ellos son aprehendidos por la diánoia. Para Sorabji, en contraste, el pensamiento no discursivo, el del Noûs, consiste en la aprehensión inmediata y simultánea de una proposición que se entiende como una identidad entre sujeto y predicado. Así, el pensamiento es complejo pero no inferencial, pues las proposiciones que el intelecto intelige son los principios de las inferencias y no ellas mismas. Recientemente, Emilsson, por su parte, sostiene que Plotino no necesariamente entendió el análisis de la complejidad del pensamiento en términos proposicionales, tal como la entendemos actualmente, y ofrece evidencia textual para mostrar que el pensamiento no-discursivo puede ser, al mismo tiempo, proposicional pues es allí en donde se encuentra la verdad entendida de este modo: proposicional.
Por mi parte, entiendo que la captación inmediata del Intelecto implica una complejidad y que la verdad, en efecto, envuelve la asociación de dos objetos. Sin embargo, aunque es cierto que Plotino en varios pasajes afirme que “el Intelecto dice lo que es”, su tipo de captación no implica la unión de “objetos” que estaban desunidos sino que es al revés. El tipo de verdad que el Intelecto capta no se da en una unión referencial de lo que está unido sino que consiste en la efectiva unión de lo que realmente es uno. En este sentido, la unión de los contenidos del intelecto y la identificación entre sujeto y objeto es real, es decir, ontológica, de ahí que esa unidad no pueda ser absoluta, pues, como he señalado, el ser ya implica determinación y, por tanto, no es uno como lo Uno.
2) Los géneros en V1 (10), 4
Según entiendo, la noción de verdad real se sustenta en la propia naturaleza de la segunda hipóstasis en la que las realidades inteligibles incluyen a la diferencia como uno de los principios ontológicos. Así en el capítulo 4 del tratado V1 (10), Plotino comienza explicando que todo lo que hay en el universo sensible se encuentra en el arquetipo y en lo más verdadero (ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀληθινώτερον ἀναβὰς), en la Inteligencia que es perfecta, completa. Ella contiene todo en sí misma, en tanto arquetipo, todo cuanto es imagen en lo sensible. Su actividad -su vida, su intelección- no implica cambio sino que en tanto modelo es causa, y en tanto causa es completa y, en consecuencia, está en reposo, pues nada hay que le falte.
Se ve que es difícil conciliar la actividad de pensar que, en varios pasajes de las Enéadas, es entendida como múltiple o compuesta, con esta caracterización de V1 (10), 4 de la naturaleza completa que la segunda hipóstasis manifiesta. Plotino explica que la completitud no es algo que la Inteligencia alcanzó mediante un proceso sino que “la Inteligencia piensa no cuando busca sino cuando posee algo” (νοεῖ δὲ οὐ ζητῶν, ἀλλ' ἔχων; 17), la Inteligencia contiene simultáneamente todas las cosas, se encuentra en reposo pues nada le falta y escapa al tiempo pues no hay allí sucesión alguna. Hasta aquí, Plotino hace hincapié en el carácter unificado de la segunda hipóstasis, pero resta explicar en qué sentido ella es múltiple y, para eso, se concentra en el análisis de los inteligibles, los contenidos de la actividad inteligente.
Tal como afirma en otros tratados, Plotino muestra aquí que la identidad entre inteligible, intelección y ser se da no solamente en cada uno de los inteligibles sino en la segunda hipóstasis en su conjunto. Se trata de una dinámica simultánea de constitución de la unidad del todo y de cada una de sus partes, pues parte y todo coinciden en una identidad absoluta. Pero para que sea posible que el pensamiento se dé efectivamente, es decir, para que haya una relación al interior de ese todo, Plotino debe incluir la noción de diferencia como parte constitutiva:
TEXTO 1: Pero la causa del pensar es algo otro (τοῦ δὲ νοεῖν αἴτιον ἄλλο), que es también causa del ser. Hay, entonces, algo otro (ἄλλο) que es simultáneamente causa de ambos. Pues ambos existen conjuntamente y no se abandonan uno al otro, sino que, aunque son dos, son esa unidad, inteligencia y ser, pensante y pensado, inteligencia (νοῦς) por pensar (νοεῖν) y ser por ser pensado (νοούμενον). (trad. Santa Cruz-Crespo, V1, 4 29-33 )
Hasta este momento del capítulo, Plotino hizo hincapié en el reposo de la inteligencia, advirtió que su pensar no implica un deseo que la mueva hacia otro, pues ella se satisface con sus propios contenidos que son ella misma, y el reposo, entonces, se explica por la identidad entre el ser, intelección e inteligente, es decir, un deseo que está eternamente satisfecho, lo que equivale a decir que ella no desea. Sin embargo, que la segunda hipóstasis esté satisfecha y que sea ser-intelección-inteligente, implica que es otra que su causa, pues lo Uno tampoco desea pero por una razón distinta, en tanto simplicidad absoluta, no es deseo satisfecho sino es no-deseo absolutamente. De este modo, Plotino al explicar la naturaleza de la segunda hipóstasis incluye el reposo y la identidad, pero también, la alteridad respecto de su causa: “En efecto, no podría haber pensar si no hubiese identidad y diferencia.” (Οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο τὸ νοεῖν ἑτερότητος μὴ οὔσης καὶ ταυτότητος δέ. 34-35), e inmediatamente explica:
TEXTO 2: These then are primary (τὰ πρῶτα), Intellect, Being, Otherness, Sameness (νοῦς, ); but one must also include Motion and Rest. One must include movement if there is thought, and rest that it may think the same; and otherness, that there may be thinker and thought; or else, if you take away otherness, it will become one and keep silent; and the objects of thought, also, must have otherness in relation to each other. But one must include sameness, because it is one with itself, and all have some common unity; and the distinctive quality (διαφορὰ) of each is otherness (ἑτερότης). (V1, 4 35-40 )
Ciertamente, la segunda hipóstasis tiene notas características, sin embargo no se trata de predicados de una entidad sino que todo aquello que conforme la Inteligencia debe ser real, pues lo que la inteligencia piensa es lo que es en sentido propio ya que ella es completa y arquetipo de todo lo sensible.
Como se ve, se puede sintetizar las notas características como los contenidos de la Inteligencia de este modo: si ser-inteligencia son lo mismo, es necesaria la identidad, pero a su vez son distintos por lo que hay que agregar la diferencia. Y el hecho de que sea intelección implica que haya actividad y vida, por lo tanto, debe haber movimiento. Pero como esa intelección es de sí misma, el inteligible no puede cambiar, por lo que debe haber reposo. Es manifiesto que en este tratado Plotino identifica los contenidos de la segunda hipóstasis con los cinco géneros del Sofista de Platón, y los introduce no como condición del lenguaje referencial sino como principios constitutivos de lo real, tal como se explicita en un tratado posterior, el VI 2 (43).
3) Los géneros en VI2 (43)
En efecto, luego de haber emprendido una crítica al sistema categorial aristotélico y estoico en el tratado VI1 (42), en el tratado VI2 (43), Plotino llevará a cabo una exégesis de los géneros del Sofista para explicar la naturaleza de la segunda hipóstasis. En el capítulo 2, comienza rechazando que las cosas que son sean especies de un género anterior, lo Uno, o que sean géneros subsumidos a uno mayor, sino que, afirma, los seres son géneros que no se subsumen unos a otros, es decir, no pueden reducirse o incluirse entre ellos por lo que son los principios constitutivos de la segunda hipóstais:
TEXTO 3: If this is so, these must certainly not only be genera but at the same time also principles of being: genera, because there are other lesser genera under them and subsequently species and individuals (ἄτομα); principles, if being is thus composed of many and the whole derives its existence from these. (VI2, 2 10-12 )
Es decir, el ser, generado, está constituido por una multiplicidad y, a la vez, genera una multiplicidad a continuación, una multiplicidad de universales, cada vez más particulares, hasta llegar al individuo. De modo que la multiplicidad genérica del ser aparece como la condición de posibilidad de la multiplicidad posterior. Es por ello que, además de géneros, son principios y son principios constitutivos no porque se constituyan como elementos de aquello que constituyen, sino porque son causas universales anteriores al particular. Además, en este capítulo, Plotino argumento que los géneros son irreductibles entre sí y no pueden agruparse en un género anterior, por lo que serán los mayores y primeros. Es decir, no están subordinados entre sí, por lo que concluye que “todos constituyen una sola naturaleza, y que el kósmos inteligible (τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ), que es al que llamamos «lo que es (τὸ ὄν) », esté constituido por todos ellos” (9-10).
Ellos no son solamente categorías universales sino que son también principios ontológicos constitutivos de lo real y abarcan “sub-conjuntos” de realidades más particulares. El sistema jerárquico de Plotino supone que el avance hacia lo sensible se entienda en términos de multiplicación y particularización, aumentando, en cada grado, la diferencia. Si esos principios, entonces, contienen de modo unitario la multiplicidad, no son solamente principios sino géneros universales que, en tanto unidades, son reales. Lo que la Inteligencia intelige no parece ser, según este pasaje, proposiciones universales verdaderas sino realidades verdaderas que coinciden con ella misma. Esa coincidencia se sustenta, precisamente, en que entre esas realidades no solamente se cuentan el ser, la identidad y el reposo sino también la diferencia y el movimiento, principios y condición de posibilidad de la multiplicidad posterior.
Ahora bien, una vez que mostró que la segunda hipóstasis es múltiple en sus principios constitutivos, en el capítulo 3 de VI2, Plotino explicará en qué sentido es Una. Cada uno de los géneros es uno y, en ese sentido, mantiene la unidad. Pero si de cada uno se predicara lo uno en el sentido de su definición, lo uno sería un género anterior a ellos y Plotino había rechazado esa alternativa, pues si lo Uno fuera un género estaría determinado y sería diferente de los otros, cosa que es inconcebible. Entonces, a propósito de la unidad de la Inteligencia, Plotino afirma:
TEXTO 4: Pero, en general, tal vez ni siquiera haya que admitir que este uno sea causa de los géneros, sino que los géneros son como partes de él y como elementos de él, y que todos constituyen una única naturaleza que nosotros dividimos mentalmente (μεριζομένην ταῖς ἡμῶν ἐπινοίαις), pero que él mismo es, en virtud de una potencia maravillosa, un uno que se extiende a todas las cosas y aparece múltiple y deviene múltiple… (trad. Igal, VI2, 3 21-25 ).
La unidad de la inteligencia se intelige como múltiple y esa intelección es la que parece constituir la multiplicidad de géneros. Así como el género de la diferencia se entiende como uno de los principios constitutivos de la multiplicidad posterior, pues es la diferencia la que permite la distinción y la determinación tanto entre las proposiciones como entre las realidades múltiples, también es la condición de posibilidad de la unión entre un sujeto y un objeto que se identifican y se mantienen en reposo. Si -como señalé a propósito de V1,4- la Inteligencia no desea porque está satisfecha, puede entenderse que en algún momento deseó y la satisfacción es permanente compleción de la diferencia, estando presentes simultáneamente la diferencia y la identidad, tal como Plotino define la actividad de pensar. La división en el seno de la segunda hipóstasis se da mediante nuestro pensamiento o reflexión (ἐπίνοια) gracias a que se trata de objetos inteligibles, pasibles de ser inteligidos por una inteligencia, lo que equivale a decir, objetos determinados y diferenciados unos de otros.
Ya en el cap. 7, Plotino destaca la prioridad ontológica de los géneros y su irreductibilidad y presenta los tres primeros: ser, movimiento y reposo. Y, en el capítulo 8, establece que estos tres géneros son objetos inteligibles:
TEXTO 5: But one must posit these three, if Intellect thinks each of them separately; but it does at once know and posit them, it it thinks, and they existe, if they have been thought. (VI2, 8 1-2 )
Estos tres inteligibles se constituyen como tales cuando la Inteligencia los piensa por separado. Como señaló antes, la división corre por cuenta de quien los piensa, pero en este caso se refiere al “sujeto inteligente”. Cabe destacar que en ese mismo acto de pensarlos los instaura por lo que en el mismo acto de separarlos, los inteligibles se constituyen como contenidos. El pensamiento sigue estando asociado con la distinción y esa será una de las bases que sustentan la inclusión de la diferencia como otro género inteligible.
En efecto, luego de aclarar que se trata de objetos de pensamiento sin materia y que la actividad se da en el ámbito eterno, Plotino acentúa la identidad de estos objetos con el “sujeto cognoscente”, es decir, la inteligencia que contiene los objetos que genera y se identifica con ellos. Pero, para que esto pueda darse en la realidad, Plotino debe argumentar la existencia de la diferencia y de la identidad.
TEXTO 6: Now when anyone sees these three, having come into intuitive contact with the nature of being, he sees being by the being in himself and the others, motion and rest, by the motion and rest in himself, and fits his own being, motion and rest to those in Intellect: they come to him together in a sort of confusion and he mingles them without distinguishing them; then as it were separating them a little and holding them away from him and distinguishing them he perceives being, motion and rest, three and each of them one. Does he not then say that they are different from each other and distinguish them in otherness, and see the otherness in being when he brings them back to unity and sees them in a unity, all one, does he not collect them into sameness and, as he looks at them, see that sameness has come to be and is? (VI2, 8 28-37 )
Se entiende que estos géneros se replican a través de toda la realidad, de un modo diversificado, pues como he señalado, la multiplicidad se entiende en términos de deficiencia. Sin embargo, si “alguien” está en condiciones de captar estos géneros tal como ellos son, es porque se encuentra “aunado” con el ser. Y, en una unión tal, evidentemente, él también es movimiento y reposo. La capacidad de captar esos tres géneros se encuentra en el hecho de que aquellos son constitutivos de la realidad, incluso de quien pueda alcanzarlos con su intelecto. Ese sujeto cognoscente si capta los géneros capta sus propias partes constitutivas. A su vez, parece que si es capaz de captar sus partes constitutivas puede distinguirlas y advertir que no son una unidad absoluta sino derivada pues la determinación que permite establecer que cada uno de los géneros es sí mismo es consecuencia de que uno de ellos es la diferencia, condición de posibilidad del pensamiento: cada uno de los inteligibles es idéntico a sí mismo y diferente de los otros cuatro. La diferencia y la identidad resultan ambos cruciales para determinar no solamente la unidad de la segunda hipóstasis y la de cada uno de sus componentes, sino también para comprender el carácter causado, es decir su carácter de no-una de ella y de sus componentes.
TEXTO 7: En consecuencia, a aquellos tres géneros es preciso añadir estos dos, identidad y alteridad, de modo que en total los géneros resultan ser cinco para todas las cosas y ellos les confieren a las realidades posteriores el ser otras e idénticas. Pues cada una de ellas es un cierto idéntico y un cierto otro, porque si fueran “idéntico” y “otro” en sentido absoluto, sin el agregado “cierto”, se contarían entre los géneros. Son, además, géneros primeros, porque nada puede predicarse de ellos en su qué es. De ellos, en efecto, predicarás el ser, pues ellos son, pero no lo predicarás como género, pues no son un cierto ser. Tampoco, a su vez, lo predicarás del movimiento ni del reposo, pues ellos no son especies del ser. Entre los seres, unos son en tanto especies del ser, y otros son por participar de él. Tampoco el ser, a su vez, participa de éstos como de sus géneros, porque no están por encima del ser ni son anteriores a él. (VI2, 8 37-48 )
Conclusiones
Mediante esta breve y esquemática exposición de algunos pasajes de las Enéadas, he intentado argumentar que el pensamiento en la segunda hipóstasis es complejo e indivisible a la vez que inmediato y simultáneo. Que la divisibilidad corra por cuenta de quien piense a los contenidos de la Inteligencia no hace sino establecer que el principio de división ya deba encontrarse en ella misma. No se trata, como afirma Plotino, de una división sustancial, en el sentido de un conjunto de sustancias, sino que a la segunda hipóstasis le cabe la distinción propia del pensamiento inmediato que, sin embargo, es la unidad más alta de lo real que incluye, en tanto real, la diferencia.
Si esto es así, el juicio proposicional depende de la naturaleza de la inteligencia en tanto contiene en sí misma los géneros mayores que, como el caso del de la diferencia, garantizan la determinación y la constitución de lo real y, en consecuencia, de las proposiciones que a ello refieren. El tipo de verdad que se encuentra en la Inteligencia no parece entenderse como la relación entre elementos simples de una proposición que refleje la efectiva unión o comunicación de los componentes de lo real, sino que, más bien, la verdad consiste en aquella efectiva composición de una multiplicidad de géneros que, en tanto tales, constituyen la unidad de lo real. Si la diánoia es capaz de establecer relaciones inferenciales y discursivas es porque en el Noûs se encuentra la condición de posibilidad del pensamiento procesual y en eso consiste, según entiendo, la interpretación ontológica u ontologizante que Plotino lleva a cabo de los cinco géneros del Sofista de Platón.
Translation - English Truth and Difference in the Second Hypostasis of Plotinus.
Introduction
In a short treatise , IV2 (21), Plotinus establishes four levels of reality, on a scale of analysis alternative to the hierarchical tripartition, according to the criteria of "divisible" (meristós) or "indivisible" (améristos). There he characterizes the lower level, the sensible mass, as the primary divisible and the higher level, the Intelligence, as the primary indivisible. The Soul is an ousía that comes from the indivisible primary and advances towards the divisible nature. In turn, in many passages of the Enneads, Plotinus asserts that Intelligence knows itself since it is in permanent contact with its objects, which are its own contents, while in the Soul, the type of self-knowledge will be of the second degree, since its activity implies a process from one object to another and the sensible perception, for its part, is the knowledge of an external and changing object. With this in mind, it is understood that the truth, in the hypostatic system of Plotinus, is at the level of the second hypostasis, since true knowledge is given in the self-knowledge of the undivided intelligence, in which there is a full identification between subject and object.
However, in many passages of the Enneads, Plotinus is emphatic when he argues that it is in Nous where there is a distinction not only between subject and object but also among its own contents that, in V1 (10), 4 or in the treatise VI2 (43), he associates in turn with the major genera of Plato's Sophist. In this work, I will try to present the notion of truth sustained in the identity between subject and object although also crossed by the notion of difference. This notion not only explains the diversity of the lower stages but it constitutes, along with the other genders, an ontological principle of being and thinking . Thus, I understand that the difference does not compromise the unity of the second hypostasis, nor turn it divisible, but it constitutes it as the first generated, while what is more "one" in the realm of the things that are. I will make use, then, of a brief analysis of Chapter 4 of Ennead V1 (10) and a few passages of chapters 2, 3 and 8 of VI2 (43) with the aim of highlighting the ontological and epistemological function that the genus of the difference presents.
1. The "propositional" truth
As I have anticipated, Plotinus characterizes the second hypostasis as an intelligence that absolutely identifies with its object, what it is. The determination that being implies does not occur in the first principle, the One, absolute simplicity and potency of all things. The being, then, coincides with the first degree of multiplicity and is constituted as intelligence when it determines, separates, that which was united in the One. By separating all things, then, it intelligizes them as multiple. However, intelligence comes from the One and is one , although it is no longer one as it is the One since it contains a deficient unity with respect to that of its cause, hence Plotinus designates it as one-multiple (ἓν πολλά).
It could be said that the second hypostasis is multiple in three aspects: it is non-one, since the One is prior to it; it is dual, because there must be a distinction between subject and object; and it is multiple, because its own contents, the Forms that identify with it, are so. Now, Plotinus states that since it is there where the truth lies, intelligence is an identical unit between subject and object. The problem is to reconcile both affirmations, that is, in what consists that simultaneous identity and multiplicity that distinguishes the second hypostasis from the third, where thought occurs through a process, at least, inferential.
Lloyd has proposed that the activity of Intelligence excludes propositional thought, and he understood that intelligible objects could constitute the simple elements that will form a judgment at the lower level. For this author, from the fact that for Plotinus the thought is complex -which implies a transition between subject and predicate- it does not follow that the type of activity of the second hypostasis is also complex, since in the thinking about the intelligibles there is an extensional and intensional identity, and the complexity implied by a proposition will depend on the way in which they are apprehended by the dianoia. According to Sorabji , in contrast, non-discursive thought, that of the Nous, consists in the immediate and simultaneous apprehension of a proposition that is understood as an identity between subject and predicate. Thus, thought is complex but not inferential, because the propositions that the intellect intelligizes are the principles of inferences and not themselves. Recently, Emilsson , for his part, argues that Plotinus does not necessarily understood the analysis of the complexity of thought in propositional terms, as we currently understand it, and he offers textual evidence to show that non-discursive thinking can be, at the same time, propositional because that is where the truth is inferred in this way: propositional.
As far as I am concerned, I understand that the immediate grasp of the Intellect implies a complexity and that the truth, in fact, involves the association of two objects. However, although it is true that Plotinus in several passages affirms that "the Intellect says what it is", its type of grasp does not imply the union of "objects" that were ununited but it implies the opposite. The kind of truth that the Intellect grasps it does not occur in a referential union of what is united but consists in the effective union of what really is one. In this sense, the union of the contents of the intellect and the identification between subject and object is real, i. e., ontological, hence that unity cannot be absolute, because, as I have pointed out, being already implies determination and, therefore, it is not one as the One.
2. The genera in VI (10), 4
As I understand it, the notion of real truth is based on the very nature of the second hypostasis in which intelligible realities include the difference as one of the ontological principles. Thus in chapter 4 of the treatise V1 (10), Plotinus begins by explaining that everything that is in the sensible universe is found in the archetype and in the truest (ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀληθινώτερον ἀναβὰς), in the Intelligence that is perfect, complete. It contains everything in itself, as an archetype, everything that is image in the sensible. His activity -his life, his intellection- does not imply change but, whereas a model, it is cause and as a cause it is complete and, consequently, it is at rest, because there is nothing lacking in it.
It is clear that it is difficult to reconcile the activity of thinking that, in several passages of the Enneads, it is understood as multiple or composed , with this characterization of V1 (10), 4 of the complete nature that the second hypostasis manifests. Plotinus explains that completeness is not something that Intelligence achieved through a process but that "[the Intellect] thinks not by seeking but by having" (νοεῖ δὲ οὐ ζητῶν, ἀλλ' ἔχων; 17), Intelligence simultaneously contains all things, It is at rest because nothing lacks and escapes from time because there is no succession there at all. So far, Plotinus emphasizes the unified character of the second hypostasis, but it remains to explain in what sense it is multiple and, for that, he concentrates on the analysis of intelligibles, the contents of intelligent activity.
As Plotinus stated in other treatises , here he shows that the identity between intelligible, intellection and being is given not only in each one of the intelligible but in the whole second hypostasis. It is about a simultaneous dynamic of constitution of the unity of the whole and of each of its parts, since part and whole coincide in an absolute identity. But for it to be possible that thought occurs effectively, that is to say, so that there is a relationship within that whole, Plotinus must include the notion of difference as a constitutive part:
But the cause of thinking is something else (τοῦ δὲ νοεῖν αἴτιον ἄλλο), which is also cause of being; they both therefore have a cause other (ἄλλο) than themselves. For they are simultaneous and exist together and one does not abandon the other, but this one is two things, Intellect and Being and thinking and thought, Intellect (νοῦς) as thinking (νοεῖν) and Being as thought (νοούμενον). (V1, 4 29-33 )
Until this part of the chapter, Plotinus focused on the rest of the intelligence, he noticed that his thinking does not imply a desire that moves it towards another, because it is satisfied with its own contents that are itself, and the rest, then, is explained by the identity between the being, intellection and intelligent, that is to say, a desire that is eternally satisfied, which is equivalent to saying that it does not desire. However, that the second hypostasis is satisfied and that it is being-intellective-intelligent, implies that it is other than its cause, since the One does not desires either but for a different reason, whereas absolute simplicity, it is not satisfied desire but it is not-desire absolutely. In this way, Plotinus by explaining the nature of the second hypostasis includes rest and identity, but also, alterity regarding its cause: “For there could not be thinking without otherness, and also sameness.” (Οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο τὸ νοεῖν ἑτερότητος μὴ οὔσης καὶ ταυτότητος δέ. 34-35), and immediately he explains:
These then are primary (τὰ πρῶτα), Intellect, Being, Otherness, Sameness (νοῦς, ); but one must also include Motion and Rest. One must include movement if there is thought, and rest that it may think the same; and otherness, that there may be thinker and thought; or else, if you take away otherness, it will become one and keep silent; and the objects of thought, also, must have otherness in relation to each other. But one must include sameness, because it is one with itself, and all have some common unity; and the distinctive quality (διαφορὰ) of each is otherness (ἑτερότης). (V1, 4 35-40 )
Certainly, the second hypostasis has characteristic features, however it is not about predicates of an entity but everything that according to the Intelligence must be real, because what the intelligence thinks is what it is in a proper sense since it is complete and archetype of all the sensible.
As can be seen, the characteristic features can be synthesized as the contents of the Intelligence in this way: if being and intelligence are the same, identity is necessary, but at the same time they are different for which the difference must be added. And the fact that it is intellection implies that there is activity and life, therefore, there must be movement. But since that intellection is of itself, the intelligible can not change, so that must be rest. It is evident that in this treatise Plotinus identifies the contents of the second hypostasis with the five genera of Plato's Sophist, and introduces them not as a condition of referential language but as constitutive principles of the real, as it is stated in a later treatise: VI 2 (43).
3. The genera in VI2 (43)
Indeed, after having undertaken a critique of the Aristotelian and Stoic categorical system in the treatise VI1 (42) , in the treatise VI2 (43), Plotinus will carry out an exegesis of the genera of the Sophist in order to explain the nature of the second hypostasis. In chapter 2, he begins by rejecting that the things that are, were species of a previous genus, the One, or that they were genera subsumed under a larger one, but, he affirms that the beings are genera that do not subsume under others, that is to say, they cannot reduce or include each other for what they are the constitutive principles of the second hypostasis:
If this is so, these must certainly not only be genera but at the same time also principles of being: genera, because there are other lesser genera under them and subsequently species and individuals (ἄτομα); principles, if being is thus composed of many and the whole derives its existence from these. (VI2, 2 10-12 )
That is to say, the being, generated, is constituted by a multiplicity and, at the same time, it generates a multiplicity then a multiplicity of universals, increasingly particular, until reaching the individual. So the generic multiplicity of being appears as the condition of possibility of the subsequent multiplicity. That is why, in addition to genera, they are principles and constitutive principles, not because they are constituted as elements of what they constitute, but because they are universal causes prior to the particular. In addition, in this chapter, Plotinus argued that genera are irreducible to each other and can not be grouped in a previous genus, so they will be the largest and first. That is, they are not subordinated to each other, so he concludes that "all contributing to one nature; the intelligible universe (τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ), which is certainly what we call being (τὸ ὄν), would be constructed from all of them" (9-10).
They are not only universal categories but they are also ontological principles constitutive of the real and include "sub-sets" of more particular realities. The hierarchical system of Plotinus assumes that the advance towards the sensible is understood in terms of multiplication and particularization, increasing, in each degree, the difference. If those principles, then, unitarily contain the multiplicity, they are not only principles but universal genera that, as units, are real. What Intelligent intelligizes does not seem to be, according to this passage, true universal propositions but real realities that coincide with itself. This coincidence is sustained, precisely, in that among these realities not only are the being, the identity and the rest, but also the difference and movement, principles and condition of possibility of the subsequent multiplicity.
Now, once he showed that the second hypostasis is multiple concerning its constitutive principles, in chapter 3 of VI2, Plotinus explains in what sense it is One. Each of the genera is one and, in that sense, maintains unity. But if the one in the sense of its definition were preached, the One would be a genus before them and Plotinus had rejected that alternative, because if the One were a genus, it would be determined and it would be different from the others, which is inconceivable. Then, with regard to the unity of Intelligence, Plotinus affirms:
But in general, perhaps not even the one should be asserted to be the cause of the others, buy they are something like parts of it, and something like elements of it, and all one nature divided into parts by our conceptions (μεριζομένην ταῖς ἡμῶν ἐπινοίαις), but [this one] itself is by a wonderful power one into all, both appearing all and becoming all... (VI2, 3 21-25 ).
The unity of the intelligence intelligizes itself as multiple and that intellection is what seems to constitute the multiplicity of genera. Just as the genus of difference is understood as one of the constitutive principles of the subsequent multiplicity, since it is the difference which allows the distinction and the determination both concerning the propositions and the multiple realities, it is also the condition of possibility of the union between a subject and an object that are identified and kept at rest. If - as I pointed out in connection with V1, 4 - Intelligence does not desire because it is satisfied, it can be understood that at some moment it wished and satisfaction is permanent completion of the difference, since difference and identity are present simultaneously, just as Plotinus defines the activity of thinking. The division in the heart of the second hypostasis is given by our thought or reflection (ἐπίνοια) thanks to the fact that they are intelligible objects, capable of being intelligized by an intelligence, which is to say, objects that are determined and differentiated from one another.
Already in chap. 7, Plotinus highlights the ontological priority of the genera and their irreducibility and presents the first three: being, motion and rest. And, in chapter 8, it states that these three genera are intelligible objects:
But one must posit these three, if Intellect thinks each of them separately; but it does at once know and posit them, it it thinks, and they exist, if they have been thought. (VI2, 8 1-2 )
These three intelligibles are constituted as such when the Intelligence thinks them separately. As he noted before, the division depends on who thinks them, but in this case it refers to the "intelligent subject". It is worth noting that in the very act of thinking them, it establishes them so that in the very act of separating them, the intelligibles are constituted as contents. The thought is still associated with the distinction and that will be one of the bases that support the inclusion of the difference as another intelligible genus.
Indeed, after clarifying that these are objects of thought without matter and that the activity takes place in the eternal realm, Plotinus accentuates the identity of these objects with the "knowing subject", that is, the intelligence that contains the objects that generates and identifies with them. But, for this to happen in reality, Plotinus must argue the existence of the difference and the identity.
Now when anyone sees these three, having come into intuitive contact with the nature of being, he sees being by the being in himself and the others, motion and rest, by the motion and rest in himself, and fits his own being, motion and rest to those in Intellect: they come to him together in a sort of confusion and he mingles them without distinguishing them; then as it were separating them a little and holding them away from him and distinguishing them he perceives being, motion and rest, three and each of them one. Does he not then say that they are different from each other and distinguish them in otherness, and see the otherness in being when he brings them back to unity and sees them in a unity, all one, does he not collect them into sameness and, as he looks at them, see that sameness has come to be and is? (VI2, 8 28-37 )
It is understood that these genera are replicated through the whole reality, in a diversified way, because as I have pointed out, the multiplicity is understood in terms of deficiency. However, if "someone" is able to grasp these genera as they are, it is because they are "united" with the being. And, in such a union, evidently, it is also motion and rest. The capacity to grasp these three genera is found in the fact that they are constitutive of the reality, even of who can reach them with their intellect. That knowing subject, if he grasps the genera, he grasps his own constituent parts. At the same time, it seems that if he is capable of grasping their constituent parts, he can distinguish them and notice that they are not an absolute unit but a derived one, since the determination that allows to establish that each of the genera is itself is the consequence of one of them is the difference, which is condition of possibility of thought: each of the intelligibles is identical to itself and different from the other four. Difference and identity are both crucial to determine not only the unity of the second hypostasis and that of each of its components, but also to understand the nature caused, that is, the non-one nature of it and of its components.
So we must add these two, the same and the other, to those first three, so that there will be in all five genera for all things, and the last two also will give to subsequent things the characters of being other and same; for each individual thing is a particular “same” and a particular “other”; for “same” and “other” without the “particular” would apply to genera. These are the primary kinds because you cannot apply any predicate to them which forms part of the definition of their essence. You will certainly predicate being of them, for they exist, but not as their genus, for they are not particular beings. Nor can you predicate being as the genus of motion and rest, for they are not specific forms of being; for some things exist as species of being, other as participating in being. Nor again does being participate in these others as if they were its genera: for they do not transcend being and are not prior to it. (VI2, 8 37-48 )
Conclusions
Through this brief and schematic exposition of some passages of the Enneads, I have tried to argue that the thought in the second hypostasis is complex and indivisible as well as immediate and simultaneous. That the divisibility depends on who thinks of the contents of the Intelligence does nothing but establish that the principle of division must already be found in itself. It is not, as Plotinus says, a substantial division, in the sense of a set of substances, but that the second hypostasis has the proper distinction of immediate thought, which, however, is the highest unit of the real that includes, since real, the difference.
If this is so, the propositional judgment depends on the nature of the intelligence insofar as it contains in itself the major genera that, like in the case of the genus of the difference, guarantee the determination and constitution of the real and, consequently, of the propositions that refer to it. The type of truth found in Intelligence does not seem to be understood as the relation among simple elements of a proposition that reflects the effective union or communication of the components of the real, but rather, truth consists in that effective composition of a multiplicity of genera that, as such, constitute the unity of the real.
If the diánoia is capable of establishing inferential and discursive relations, it is because in the Nous there is the condition of possibility of the processual thought and that is, as I understand it, the ontological or ontologizing interpretation that Plotinus carries out of the five genera of the Plato’s Sophist.
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